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TARGETED ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: STUDENT PRIVACY VS.
PROTECTED SPEECH
Marco Crocetti*

I. INTRODUCTION
As technology has started to play a bigger role in education, student information has increasingly shifted from paper to digital and online formats. This
shift has unlocked many new potential uses for student information. Consequently, schools from the Kindergarten to 12th grade level (“K-12”) have started to adopt online education technology, for example, tools that allow students
to collaborate on assignments, or to receive lectures, textbooks, homework,
and assessments online.1 As the adoption rate of online education technology
has increased, so has the quantity and quality of student information collected
by schools, government entities, and education technology companies
(“ETCs”).
As the collection and use of student information by schools and ETCs has
increased, state legislatures throughout the country have begun regulating student information. In 2014, at least 110 bills attempting to regulate student information were introduced throughout 36 state legislatures.2 In 2015, the number rose to at least 182 bills.3 These proposals seek to regulate student information privacy (e.g. how student information can be accessed, used, or disclosed) and security (e.g. how student information must be stored and protect*
Juris Doctor 2016, Georgetown University Law Center. I am deeply grateful to Professor David Vladeck for his invaluable guidance, challenges and feedback on this project.
Additionally, for the many helpful conversations, debates and feedback, I am also very
thankful to Mack Abbeduto.
1
See generally Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1177 (2014 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 2014, 5 (enumerating methods to protect students ranging from
K-12 from targeted advertisements and disclosure of salient information).
2
Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in 2015, and What Is Next?, DATA
QUALITY CAMPAIGN 1 (Sept. 24, 2015), http://dataqualitycampaign.org/findresources/student-data-privacy-legislation-2015.
3
Id.
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ed), without hindering educational quality and opportunity. For example, many
states have attempted to regulate the permissibility of targeted advertising
based on student information.4 As a result, schools and ETCs that provide services involving student information have had to grapple with increased compliance costs in order to avoid liability and public relations (“PR”) risks.5
This article will analyze the constitutionality of California’s approach in the
recently passed “Student Online Personal Information Protection Act”
(“SOPIPA”)6 to regulating targeted advertising based on student information.7
This article was motivated by the negative economic consequences of banning
targeted advertising, namely the closing off of a potentially large revenue
source that could be diverted to making educational resources cheaper and to
investing in lower income technologically equipped-school districts.8 This article will show that SOPIPA bars certain forms of advertising that could be beneficial to students, parents, and teachers. Subsequently, this article will argue
that SOPIPA’s advertising prohibitions raise serious First Amendment concerns, namely that when construed fairly, SOPIPA is overly broad and more
restrictive than necessary to advance California’s alleged governmental objectives. Finally, this article will conclude by proposing a number of less restrictive alternatives that would sufficiently advance California’s governmental
objective, such as consent exceptions, industry self-regulatory regimes, and
advertising filtering regimes. These alternatives would be easy to implement,
and many have already been incorporated into similar state student privacy
laws throughout the country.
II. BACKGROUND AND IMPETUS FOR SOPIPA
SOPIPA is the product of privacy and security concerns raised by privacy
advocates and parent groups in response to the increased collection of student
4
See generally H.B. 1961, 2015, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); S. 89,
2015 Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2015); S. 183, 454 127th Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015); S. 187, 78th Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2015); H.B. 289, 1248 (Md. 2016).
5
Michelle J. Anderson & Jim Halpert, New student data privacy laws: top points for
school contractors and K-12 education sites, apps and online services, DLA PIPER (Jan. 6,
2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/01/new-student-dataprivacy-laws.
6
See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584a-r (West 2015) (setting forth proscribed activities regarding targeted advertisements and disclosure of personal information
for K-12 students).
7
SOPIPA, also known as California Senate Bill 1177, was passed by the California
state legislature at the end of 2014, and became effective on January 1, 2016. Id.
8
Kate Kaye, In Wake of Privacy Laws, Kids’ Sites See Ad Revenue Plummet, ADAGE
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/kids-sites-freakingprivacy-laws/243795.
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information.9 However, before delving into these concerns, it is important to
first understand the benefits of the increased collection of student information.10 First, teachers can better allocate instruction time by using services
that identify in real-time which students are struggling on a particular subject.11
Second, many educational tools now allow parents to create parental access
accounts, where they can track their child’s progress before a point of no return, e.g. finalized grades on a report card.12 Third, academic experts have used
student information to better analyze how students learn and to evaluate curriculum models, education policies (e.g., No Child Left Behind), and the predictive value of standardized tests.13
ETCs have also used student information to create tools that allow students
to personalize learning.14 Personalized learning means that “instruction is paced
to learning needs, tailored to learning preferences, and tailored to the specific
interests of different learners…Learning goals are the same for all students, but
students can progress through the material at different speeds according to their
learning needs. For example, students might take longer to progress through a
given topic, skip topics that cover information they already know, or repeat
topics they need more help on.”15 Schools across the United States have started
to recognize the benefits of a personalized learning model, compared to the
current one-size fits all model.16
These technologies have the potential to greatly enhance student achievement; however, they must not become a privilege only for those school districts and parents that can afford it. Unfortunately, there are currently a variety
of economic factors that have made it difficult for schools to adopt new ETC

Benjamin Herold, Landmark Student-Data-Privacy Law Enacted in California, ED(Sept. 30, 2014),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2014/09/_landmark_student-dataprivacy.html.
10 See generally Who uses student data?, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://dataqualitycampaign.org/find-resources/who-uses-student-data.The increased collection of student information has resulted in many beneficial applications, largely created by
ETCs, for education stakeholders across the spectrum, including parents, students, teachers,
school administrators, state and federal departments of education, education researchers,
policy makers, and ETCs. Id.
11 Data: The Missing Piece to Improving Student Achievement, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN (Apr. 23, 2013), http://dataqualitycampaign.org/find-resources/data-the-missingpiece-to-improving-student-achievement.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Edtech Wiki: Personalized Learning, EDSURGE,
https://www.edsurge.com/research/edtech-wiki/personalized-learning (last visited Sept. 30,
2016).
15 Id.
16 Id.
9
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tools. First, state education budgets have been plagued with funding cuts.17
Second, many schools throughout the country, especially in lower income and
rural areas, do not have sufficient computer or internet infrastructures to run
new education technology tools.18 Further exacerbating this problem is the reality that many families still do not have their own home computer or a sufficient
internet connection.19 Third, lower income and rural areas, compared to schools
in higher income urban areas, often do not have the budget to invest in upgrading their technology (e.g. buying more computers or upgrading their internet
speeds), or to afford education technology that is not free (i.e. that charges a
one-time fee, or subscription model).20 This is largely due to the fact that
roughly 40 percent of school funding is based on local property taxes – which
often results in disproportionately small budgets for lower income areas.21 Finally, due to the current political trend surrounding school funding, it is unlikely that these budgets will increase by any marketable amount in the near future.22 Consequently, these dynamics are creating an increasing digital divide
between who has access to the latest education tools.
Fortunately, revenue from targeted advertising may be able to help remedy
the growing digital divide in education. In response to educational budgetary
constraints, and to increase the availability of their services, ETCs have started
to realize the commercial potential of student information.23 Through advertising ETCs can potentially supplement the revenue from their education technology tools and services, partially or completely, allowing them to offer their
services to schools and students at a reduced cost. In order to maximize revenue from advertising, ETCs may want to use student information, or even
teacher and parent information, collected through their tools, to target advertisements to students, parents, and teachers.24 Thus, the promulgation of student
17 Michael Leachman, et al., Most States Have Cut School Funding, and Some Continue
Cutting, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/most-states-have-cut-school-fundingand-some-continue-cutting.
18 Id.
19 John Wihbey, Computer Usage and Access in Low-Income Urban Communities,
JOURNALIST’S RES., http://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/internet/computer-usageaccess-low-income-urban-communities (last updated Aug. 19, 2013).
20 Id.
21 Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., More Than 40% of Low-Income Schools Don’t Get a
Fair Share of State and Local Funds, Department of Education Research Finds (Nov. 30,
2011).
22 Michael Leachman, supra note 18.
23 Tanya Roscorla, California Protects Student Data Privacy with Two Bills, CTR. FOR
DIGITAL EDUC. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.centerdigitaled.com/news/California-ProtectsStudent-Data-Privacy-with-Two-Bills.html.
24 For example, they may want to advertise extracurricular activities, supplies, supple-
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privacy regulations should not be an isolated process, and instead should
acknowledge the broader education landscape.
Despite the beneficial uses of student information, the increased collection
of potentially sensitive and personal information has generated concern among
parent and privacy groups.25 Primary areas of concern have included how personal student information can be collected, used, disclosed, accessed, and secured. Parent and privacy groups are especially concerned with the personal
student information being used or disclosed for targeted advertising or other
commercial purposes.26 For example, ETCs could use personal student information to create profiles describing various attributes of a student. Such a profile could in turn be used to tailor advertisements to a student based on their
personal information. These concerns have only been exacerbated by education
technology’s rapid growth and school adoption rate.27
California happens to house the headquarters of numerous ETCs and has a
state legislature that heavily focuses on protecting consumer privacy.28 Thus, it
is no coincidence that the California state legislature would address issues relating to the management of student information. California Senator Darrell
Steinberg, now retired, introduced SOPIPA as a bill to promote the privacy and
security of student information.29 He wanted to limit the ability of ETCs to use
or disclose student information for commercial purposes, especially targeted
advertising. The California Senate Judiciary Bill Analysis of SOPIPA documented Senator Steinberg’s intent as wanting to close “loopholes that can be
exploited by Internet companies for profit through collecting and sharing students’ personal information obtained through online services marketed for
school purposes.”30 Senator Steinberg believed that Internet companies were
“operating with zero restrictions . . . [which] is unacceptable. Kids are in the
classroom to learn and we [must] value the security of their personal information above private profit.”31
mentary tutoring services, or even financial aid information for college.
25 S. Judic. Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2014).
26 James P. Steyer, Bill Would Safeguard Students’ Data from Cloud-Computing Providers, COMMON SENSE MEDIA (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/kidsaction/blog/bill-would-safeguard-students-data-from-cloud-computing-providers; Tanya
Roscorla, supra note 24.
27 James P. Steyer, supra note 27.
28 Marc Lifsher, New California Assembly Privacy Panel is ‘The Key Committee to
Watch’, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-capitol-businessbeat-20150119-story.html.
29 S. Judic. Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., at 7 (Cal. 2014).
30 Id. at 4.
31 Id. The claim that there are “zero restrictions” was likely a hyperbolic statement by
Senator Steinberg. Under California law minors (e.g. under age 18) are protected by California Senate Bill 568 (2013) (authored by Senator Steinberg). Additionally, under federal
law student information is protected by FERPA, COPPA and the PPRA (discussed below).
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III. WHAT SOPIPA REGULATES AND REQUIRES
SOPIPA requires entities that provide online K-12 educational services to
comply with certain privacy and security requirements regarding the information they collect.32 A summary of SOPIPA’s requirements is outlined in the
law’s digest (i.e. a summary of how the new law affects current law).33 The
digest states:
This bill would prohibit an operator [defined below] of an Internet Web site,
online service, online application, or mobile application from knowingly [1] engaging in targeted advertising to students or their parents or legal guardians, [2]
using covered information [defined below] to amass a profile about a K–12 student, [3] selling a student’s information, or [4] disclosing covered information . . .
. The bill would [also] require an operator to implement and maintain reasonable
security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the covered information, to protect the information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure, and to delete a student’s covered information if the
school or district requests deletion of data under the control of the school or district.34

A. What Entities Are Covered by SOPIPA?
Before delving into SOPIPA’s advertising regulations, it is important to first
understand what entities are regulated. SOPIPA regulates “operators,” which
are defined as “the operator of an Internet Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application with actual knowledge that the site, service, or
application [1] is used primarily for K–12 school purposes and [2] was designed and marketed for K–12 school purposes.”35 It is helpful to clarify that
the operator definition does not use a contract base approach to regulating operators. Thus instead of stating that any company that contracts with a school
or teacher to provide an educational service must comply with the following
requirements, this law takes a categorical approach of regulating providers –
i.e. anyone that provides a service that falls under the operator and “K-12
School Purposes” definition. The categorical approach is broader in the sense
that it includes all companies that fit into this category, but narrower in the
sense that a contract approach could apply to any company that contracts with
a school irrespective of the type of service being provided. However, to fully
Id.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584.
Under California Law, the “Digest” is language prepared by the Legislative Counsel
and summarizes the effect of the proposed bill on current law. A Guide for Accessing California Legislative Information on the Internet, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/guide.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
34 S.B. 1177, Reg. Sess. 2013-2014 (Cal. 2014).
35 Id.
32
33
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understand the scope of the operator definition and what services and entities
are covered we need to understand what are considered “K-12 School Purposes.”
“K-12 School Purposes” are defined as:
Purposes that customarily take place at the direction of the K–12 school, teacher,
or school district or aid in the administration of school activities, including, but
not limited to, instruction in the classroom or at home, administrative activities,
and collaboration between students, school personnel, or parents, or are for the use
and benefit of the school.36

Applying the Operator and “K-12 School Purposes” definitions together,
SOPIPA regulates a broad spectrum of online services in schools. SOPIPA
regulates any operator that designs and markets a website for “K-12 School
Purposes,” and knows that the website is primarily used for those purposes.
For example, an operator would be regulated if the operator (1) designed and
marketed a website that helped teachers lecture to students, and (2) knew that
the website was primarily used to help teachers lecture to students.
The core purpose of SOPIPA is to regulate services that are used in schools,
at direction of a teacher, and are part of the student’s curriculum.37 However,
the broad language of the “K-12 School Purposes” definition may ensnare
companies and services that are beyond the intended scope of SOPIPA. For
example, SOPIPA regulates entities that operate services that (1) are designed
and marketed for X, and (2) are primarily used for X. For this example, X is
functioning as an abbreviation for the “K-12 School Purposes” definition.
However, within SOPIPA it is unclear whether X only includes a purpose that
is uniquely related to a school (e.g. an online high school science textbook), or
if X is simply a purpose that could benefit a school but is not unique to a
school (e.g. an accounting service that is used in the same way by a post office,
a police department, or a private company). Student privacy laws in Maine,
Nevada, Virginia, and Washington have used more precise language to make
clear that their laws only regulate services specifically “designed and marketed
for use in public schools.”38 Thus, under Washington’s student privacy law,
fictional company Infinity’s information storage platform would not be regulated if it was not designed and marketed for use in public schools, but was
instead designed and marketed for use by any entity that wants to store information in their storage system.
Id.
S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
38 See S.B. 463, 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015) (“School service” means an Internet website, online service or mobile application that: (a) Collects or maintains personally identifiable information concerning a pupil; (b) Is used primarily for educational purposes; and (c) Is
designed and marketed for use in public schools and is used at the direction of teachers and
other educational personnel.”); see also H.B. 1612, Gen. Assemb. (Va. 2015); S.B. 5419,
64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
36
37
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Whereas under these alternative state definitions it would be clear that Infinity’s information storage platform would not be regulated under SOPIPA if it
was marketed their services generally and not uniquely for schools – the opposite interpretation may be reasonable under SOPIPA’s definition.39 For example, Infinity’s information storage platform could be regulated under SOPIPA
simply if Infinity (1) marketed the product to schools (in addition to other entities) and (2) if a school could possibly benefit from an information storage service that could store all of the school’s records. Arguably, to fall within SOPIPA’s scope, Infinity would not need to market the service to schools at all, but
simply market to anyone who is interested in information storage. Thus Infinity’s information storage system could be regulated under SOPIPA even if information storage service is not uniquely designed and marketed for student
information storage, and could simply be just as useful to a private hospital for
storing medical records. Consequently, the following “K-12 School Purposes”
language, “for the use and benefit of the school” or “aid in the administration
of school activities,”40 can be interpreted as including any activity that could
possibly benefit the school or aid in its administration.
The operator definition can also be interpreted more broadly than intended
by the California state legislature. First, the operator definition is not narrowly
tailored to only regulate a specific type of entity, e.g. a corporation. Instead,
the lack of specificity means that an operator could be any person, corporation,
nonprofit, or governmental entity that operates (e.g. controls the functioning
of) a website that falls under the operator and “K-12 School Purposes” definitional scope.41 Second, the operator definition functions to regulate the entity
that operates the website, instead of the website itself.42 For example, if a company operates two information storage services, one that is designed and marketed generally (e.g. to anyone who wants to store any information), and another storage service that is designed and marketed for “K-12 School Purposes,” and primarily used for those purposes; the company as a whole could be
regulated by SOPIPA (because it technically is an Operator of a “K-12 School
Purposes” service). Consequently, the company would have to abide by SOPIPA’s requirements and conduct prohibitions when operating the more general
service, in addition to the “K-12 School Purposes” service. This is clear because SOPIPA’s ban on advertising and other conduct prohibit an “operator,”

39 S.B. 463, 78th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2015); H.B. 1612, Gen. Assemb. (Va. 2015); S.B.
5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
40 S.B. 463, 78th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2015); H.B. 1612, Gen. Assemb. (Va. 2015); S.B.
5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
41 S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
42 Id.
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not the operator’s service, from engaging in such activity.43 Specifically,
SOPIPA states “[a]n operator shall not knowingly engage in any of the following activities with respect to their site, service or application.”44
When enacting similar laws, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland, Maine, and Oregon have attempted to fix the “Operator” definition ambiguity by adding the
following change to be precise as to the types of services and business practices regulated by the law, specifically adding “to the extent that the person is
operating in that capacity” to the end of the definition.45 This amendment is
critical to ensuring that the law doesn’t apply to the non-school portions of an
operator’s service.46
Further, even if SOPIPA’s conduct prohibitions were interpreted to only
pertain to operator activity “with respect to their site, service or application,”
the law does not specify that the prohibition only applies to their ‘K-12 School
Purposes’ site, service or application.47 Instead, this clause could refer to any of
its many services. For example, because fictional company Infinity is an “operator” for its Student Education App, which was designed and market for “K12 School Purposes”, it arguably could be subject to SOPIPA’s conduct prohibitions regarding all services, in addition to the Student Education App, due to
the statutes imprecision and focus on “operator conduct” versus “service conduct”. Thus, under SOPIPA, Infinity’s information storage platform, which
was not designed and marketed for “K-12 School Purposes,” could be subject
to SOPIPA’s conduct prohibitions.48
B. What “Operator” Conduct Does SOPIPA Prohibit?
Understanding the scope of what entities and services are regulated by
SOPIPA will provide a helpful foundation for the focus of this article, namely
the constitutionality of the absolute prohibition on targeted advertising. The
prohibition on targeted advertising states that:

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(a).
Id. at § 22584(b).
45 H.B. 1961, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); S.B. 89,153rd Gen. Assemb.
(Ga. 2015); H.B. 298, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015); S.B. 183, 127th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015); S.B. 187, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).
46 SOPIPA: Student Online Personal Information Protection Act, TERMSFEED (Jan. 26,
2015), https://termsfeed.com/blog/sopipa/ (listing the possible entities that are considered
operator under the act).
47 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(b).
48 Cf., Id. at § 22584(m) (“This section does not apply to general audience Internet web
sites, general audience online services, general audience online applications, or general audience mobile applications, even if login credentials created for an operator’s site, service,
or application may be used to access those general audience sites, services, or applications.”).
43
44
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(b) An operator shall not knowingly engage in any of the following activities with
respect to their site, service, or application . . . (1)(A) Engage in targeted advertising on the operator’s site, service, or application, or (B) target advertising on any
other site, service, or application when the targeting of the advertising is based
upon any information, including covered information and persistent unique identifiers, that the operator has acquired because of the use of that operator’s site, service, or application.49

To understand the scope and consequences of the targeted advertising ban it
is helpful to break up the analysis into the following four categories. First,
what would trigger the targeted advertising ban? The ban is triggered when
advertisements are targeted based on “any information, including covered information and persistent unique identifiers, that the operator has acquired because of the use of that operator’s site, service or application.”50 This is a very
broad trigger, because it includes literally “any information,” instead of being
scoped more narrowly, for example, to only “covered information,” which is
defined in the law.51 If the trigger only included covered information the ban
would focus more on sensitive information, i.e., information that personally
identifies a student like the student’s name or email address.52 Instead the ban
could be triggered by the use of de-identified information, (i.e. information that
cannot reasonably be used to identify or trace back to a student) or aggregated
data (i.e. the mean test scores of all students in a school).53
49
50
51

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(b)(1).
Id. at § 22584(b)(1)(B).
Id. at § 22584(h)(i).
“Covered information” means personally identifiable information or
materials, in any media or format that meets any of the following: (1) Is
created or provided by a student, or the student’s parent or legal guardian, to an operator in the course of the student’s, parent’s, or legal guardian’s use of the operator’s site, service, or application for K–12 school
purposes. (2) Is created or provided by an employee or agent of the K–
12 school, school district, local education agency, or county office of
education, to an operator. (3) Is gathered by an operator through the operation of a site, service, or application described in subdivision (a) and
is descriptive of a student or otherwise identifies a student, including,
but not limited to, information in the student’s educational record or
email, first and last name, home address, telephone number, email address, or other information that allows physical or online contact, discipline records, test results, special education data, juvenile dependency
records, grades, evaluations, criminal records, medical records, health
records, social security number, biometric information, disabilities, socioeconomic information, food purchases, political affiliations, religious
information, text messages, documents, student identifiers, search activity, photos, voice recordings, or geolocation information.

Id.
Id. at § 22584(h)(i).
For more examples and explanation of aggregate data in the education context See
DEP’T OF EDUC., PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS – DIS52
53
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Further, it is important to understand that “any information” is not limited to
student related information. Instead “any information” could include all of the
information collected from teachers, school administrators, and parents that use
the regulated service. For example, the “Covered Information” definition includes personally identifiable information or materials that are “created or provided by an employee or agent of the K-12 school, school district, local education agency, or county office of education, to an operator.”54 Thus the targeted
advertising ban does not textually have a student focus, but instead has a “User” focus, i.e. prohibiting using or disclosing any information collected from
anyone through the service for targeted advertising purposes. When referred to
below, “User” will be defined as any Student, Parent, Teacher, or School Official that uses an Operator’s “K-12 School Purposes” service. Consequently, the
ban also applies to all audiences, i.e. SOPIPA prohibits targeting advertisements to anyone, whether they are students, parents, minors, adults, schools, or
business.55
Second, what activity does the ban prohibit? The first word in the ban, “engage,” is a broad term that prohibits any operator conduct that facilitates targeted advertising (whether the operator is acting alone or with third parties).56
In practice this means that an operator cannot collect, use or disclose any information acquired from the use of its site for the purpose of targeted advertising.57 It will be helpful to discuss “use” and “disclose” separately. Although
illegal under SOPIPA, there are many ways an operator hypothetically could
use information such as “covered information” to serve advertisements without
disclosing it to third parties.58 For example, many websites currently serve advertisements by creating forms generated by personal information collected
from consumers.59 Imagine a form like a menu of drop down boxes where advertisers can select from a list of demographics (e.g. age, gender, location,
etc.), and the website will send the advertisements to the consumers that fit into
those demographics.
If information is properly de-identified, the advertiser is unlikely to learn the
identities of the individuals who receive the advertisements.60 Although, in
CLOSURE AVOIDANCE, 1-2 (2013),

http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/FAQs_disclosure_avoidance.pdf (explaining that aggregate data still requires disclosure avoidance to prevent identification).
54 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(h)(i)(2).
55 Id. at § 22584(b)(1)(A).
56 Id. at § 22584(b).
57 Id. at § 22584(1)-(3).
58 Id. at § 22584(b)(1).
59 How to Target Facebook Ads: Refine Your Advertising to Reach the People That
Matter Most to Your Business, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/a/onlinesales/ad-targeting-details (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
60 Cf. supra note 54, at 3 (explaining there can be a small risk of de-identification).
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some cases there can be a risk of re-identification if the de-identification is not
executed rigorously to make sure all personal identifiers are removed, or if the
data set concerns a small population of people and the person seeking to reidentify knows data points about the person they are looking for.61 For example, take a pizza advertisement; the advertiser is unlikely to learn that it is John
or Jane specifically (i.e. compared to someone else) that are thirty, live in
Washington, D.C. and like pizza. Instead all the advertiser would know is that
the pizza advertisement has been sent to men and women in their thirties in
Washington, D.C. Through this method, the operator can decide what information the advertiser does and does not receive. The operator can prevent the
advertiser from receiving a consumer’s personal information, such as the consumer’s name or email. For example, the operator can create a system where
the advertiser can only view aggregate statistics of that information (e.g. there
are five hundred men and women in their thirties in Washington, D.C. that like
pizza, and that are consumers of the operator’s website).
In contrast, if operators disclose (in addition to only using) personal information collected from consumers to advertisers, then the same demographic
forms, provided by operators and used by advertisers, would contain personal
information. For example, the demographic forms would have a list of the
names of John, Jane and every other man and women in their thirties in Washington, D.C. that likes pizza and is a consumer of the operator’s website. The
prohibition on using information for targeted advertising is further complicated
by SOPIPA’s ‘Amassing a Profile’ ban. This provision prohibits an operator
from amassing a profile on a student except for “K-12 School Purposes.”62 A
student information profile can be analogized to a student’s education record,
which includes a student’s name, address, courses, and grades. However, a
student information profile can also include information on a student’s online
behavior such as their website browsing history, or how long it took the student to complete an assignment.
Third, where are targeted advertisements prohibited? Neither an operator,
nor any other entity (i.e., third party advertiser), can target advertise on the
operator’s service. For example, an operator providing a service to complete
homework problems cannot advertise supplementary practice problems on the
61 See Id. at 2 (explaining that an accidental disclosure can occur when data in aggregate
reports are unintentionally presented in a manner that allows individual students to be identified).
62 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(b)(2) (regarding the prohibition on amassing a
profile, SOPIPA states that an operator cannot knowingly: “(2) Use information, including
persistent unique identifiers, created or gathered by the operator’s site, service, or application, to amass a profile about a K–12 student except in furtherance of K–12 school purposes.”).
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service. The ban also prohibits the operator from using or disclosing any information it has collected to target advertisements “on any other site, service,
or application.”63 For example, an operator cannot use collected information to
tailor the advertisements viewed on CNN’s website by students or parents.
Thus, an operator cannot target advertisements on or off its “K-12 School Purposes” service.
C. Beneficial Advertising Banned Under SOPIPA
Banning targeted advertising outright has broad consequences. Because the
ban prohibits any type of advertisement, regardless of its content, the ban is not
limited to advertisements that are predatory or deceptive, i.e. intended to induce consumers, especially vulnerable consumers, with false or misleading
information. Thus, the ban also prohibits a wide variety of non-deceptive ads
that parents, students and teachers could find valuable. For example, they are
likely to find valuable advertisements related to education, jobs, or politics. In
addition to its breadth, the ban is absolute and does not provide users (i.e., parents, students, or teachers) with choice regarding whether or not they would
like to receive certain advertisements. Failure to provide a consent mechanism
represents a major deviation from other statutes that seek to protect the privacy
of minors and students.64 Although the ban absolutely prohibits targeted advertisements, SOPIPA does not prohibit presenting the same exact advertisement
as long as it is not targeted-based information collected by an operator its “K12 School Purposes” service.65 Thus, general (non-targeted) advertisements
that are presented in the education technology platform to every teacher or every student in the school are not prohibited. Following are examples of some of
the least controversial categories of advertisements that ‘Users’ could reasonably find valuable.
College & Career Counseling Ads: One could imagine a “K-12 School
Purposes” service that has an online college counseling tool where students can
input the following information: grades, academic interests, extracurricular
activities, and a list of desired colleges. To many, this request for information
on the internet is a very familiar and routine exercise, often taking the form of
googling factoids to rebut friends, entering travel dates to book flights, or looking up the best new restaurants in your area. The results generated often fit into
one of two categories: (1) those paid for by advertisers, or (2) those not paid
Id. at § 22584(b)(1)(B).
See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1-2)
(2016); Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a) (2016); Protection of
Pupil Rights Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (2015).
65 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(o).
63
64
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for by advertisers and instead are generated by relevance to the inputted terms.
In the second category, a student would enter the above information and receive information on all of the most relevant colleges or jobs, without these
results being influenced by one of the colleges bidding to be higher up in the
results. This request for information could also be helpful in recommending to
students the next book in a series, or supplementary reading if the student
would like to go further into a certain subject.
There is also a third scenario, where the colleges generated in the nonaltered search may want to unilaterally provide tailored follow up information
to the student. Based on the inputted information, parents and students could
receive advertisements about financial aid options, college application counseling, or college specific information. College specific information could include
test score and GPA requirements, department strengths (e.g. the college is
ranked fifth in math), career placements, the price of living, tuition costs and
financing options. Similarly, such a tool could be used by employers to target
internships and extracurricular activities to students, based on student-selected
interests.
On an imaginary spectrum of what is and is not advertising, requests for information with results generated without any influence or payment by the result entity (i.e. the college, company etc.) are theoretically the least likely to be
considered advertisements and can provide valuable information to students.
Many states that have adopted their own versions of SOPIPA have realized the
value of these recommendations, have decided to define targeted advertising,
and provide an exemption for such ‘recommendation engines.’66 For example,
the Maryland Student Privacy law passed in 2015, modeled after SOPIPA, created a new section stating:
(j) This Section does not limit the ability of an operator to: (2) Use recommendation engines to recommend to a student additional content or services relating to
an educational, other learning, or employment opportunity purpose within an operator’s site, service or application if the recommendation is not determined in
whole or in part by payment or other consideration from a third party; (3) Respond
to a student’s search query, other request for information, or request for feedback
if the information or response is not determined in whole or in part by payment or
other consideration from a third party.67

Arkansas, Maine, Georgia, Nevada, and Washington have all enacted simi-

66 See Amelia Vance, Policymaking on Education Data Privacy: Lessons Learned 8
(2016), http://www.nasbe.org/wp-content/uploads/Vance_Lessons-Learned-Final.pdf
(providing examples of states such as Virginia and Utah that have amended its SOPIPAstyle law to define ‘targeted advertising’ and allowing ‘recommendation engines’ as an exception).
67 H.B. 298, 435th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015).
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lar language to the recommendation engine exception,68 and Arkansas, Georgia
Nevada and Oregon have all enacted similar language to the request for information exception.69
Discounts Ads: One could also envision businesses having an incentive to
offer discounts to their services for being able to provide targeted advertisements. For example, an operator could be willing to discount the subscription
fee for its ‘K-12 School Purposes’ service if it could recoup revenue through
targeted advertising. Additionally, extracurricular math or science camps could
be willing to discount the admission fees to their camps if they can target their
advertising to students interested in math and science. For advertisers, it could
be worth discounting their services because, due to the targeted information,
they would get more value for each advertisement by serving consumers who
are more likely to be interested in their services. Targeted advertisements to
parents, students, and teachers could also increase the reach of an advertiser’s
brand.
Political Ads: This article takes the position that students should not be insulated from the political discourse. Prohibiting political advertising in schools
could act to close off a major forum for children to receive political information and be able to engage in the debate. Children spend a considerable
amount of their childhood in school settings, and because school attendance is
compulsory, children would have little freedom to avoid any political content
they are exposed to in schools. Additionally, it should not matter if the student
audience cannot vote at the time of election because early education will promote a more politically informed electorate. Students’ ineligible to vote can
still participate in the political process by writing letters, organizing events,
and knocking on doors.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
Any statute that restricts expressive activity must be viewed under the lens
of the First Amendment.70 The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”71 When deter-

68 H.B. 1961, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); S.B. 89, 153rd Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 298, 435th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015); S. Proposal
183, 127th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015); S.B. 463, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015); S.B.
5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
69 H.B. 1961, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); S.B. 89, 153rd Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015); H.B. 298, 435th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015); S.B. 463,
78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015); S.B. 187, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).
70 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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mining whether a statute violates the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
generally will first examine whether the expression is protected.72 Commercial
speech, i.e. speech advertising a product or proposing a commercial transaction, is protected by the First Amendment.73 However, this protection is in
some ways more limited than the protection given to non-commercial (i.e. political) speech.74
For commercial speech to be protected by the First Amendment it must at
least concern constitutionally protected speech.75 Within the commercial
speech doctrine there is a clear distinction between how the Court views protected versus unprotected speech.76 Protected commercial speech concerns informational speech that does not fall into an unprotected category.77 Whereas
commercial speech that is false, misleading, deceptive, or concerns an illegal
transaction, is not entitled to First Amendment protection.78 In fact, there are
already many regularly-enforced laws that prohibit unprotected commercial
speech.79
SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban would be appropriately analyzed under
the commercial speech doctrine because it bans expressive activity that advertises a product or proposes a commercial transaction.80 This ban restricts both
protected and unprotected commercial speech; however, when conducting the
commercial speech analysis, this article will focus only on the constitutionality
of restricting protected commercial speech (i.e. targeted advertisements that are
not deceptive, misleading or illegal). Additionally, it is worth noting that the
targeted advertising ban also prohibits political speech (i.e. political advertisements), and thus could bear greater scrutiny.81 For example, if certain condiCent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 563.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 563-64.
79 See Division of Advertising Practices, FTC.GOV, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-advertising-practices
(last visited Jan. 11, 2016); See also Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States:
A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practice Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER L.
CTR. 2 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf.
80 S. Judic. Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., at 8 (Cal. 2014) (“It
should be noted that this bill would limit advertising (“commercial speech”) under the First
Amendment.”); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2657 (2011) (“The
creation and dissemination of information are speech for First Amendment purposes. See,
e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787.”).
81 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) ((stating “laws
that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
72
73
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tions are met,82 California would likely have to prove that it has a compelling
interest to justify a ban on politically targeted advertisements.83 A “compelling
interest” is a greater burden for the government to satisfy than the standard for
restricting commercial speech, and thus restrictions on political speech are
rarely upheld.84 However, this article will focus on the commercial speech
analysis of SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban.
The Supreme Court’s “review of commercial speech restrictions has gradually become more stringent over time . . . leaning further and further in the direction of strict scrutiny . . . . [more specifically] the Supreme Court’s review
has become more rigorous over time, but only for a certain type of commercial
speech regulation: laws that restrict non-misleading, informational advertising.”85 Thus, California may restrict protected commercial speech only if the
regulation meets the three following requirements originally articulated in Central Hudson: (1) the asserted government interest is substantial, (2) the government interest is directly advanced by the law, and (3) and the law is “more
extensive than is necessary” to achieve the government’s interest.86
A. First Amendment Argument Summary
The constitutional analysis below will focus on illustrating how SOPIPA’s
targeted advertising ban would likely be held by the Supreme Court to be an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech. Specifically, the Court
would likely hold that the ban is overly broad and is more restrictive than necessary to achieve California’s alleged governmental objectives. As mentioned
that interest.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
82 For example, if the advertiser could show that SOPIPA is a content-based, in contrast
to a content-neutral, restriction on political speech in a public forum. See Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988) (“Our cases indicate that as a content-based restriction on political
speech in a public forum, § 22-1115 must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. Thus,
we have required the State to show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983);
Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572-573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S 171, 177 (1983)).
83 Id.
84 Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (10th ed. 2014) (“A method for determining the constitutional validity of a law, whereby the government’s interest in the law and
its purpose are balanced against an individual’s constitutional right that is affected by the
law. Only if the government’s interest is strong enough will the law be upheld.”).
85 Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L. J.
497, 499 (2015).
86 Bd. of Tr. of St. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (quoting Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
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above, this analysis will focus only on the constitutionality of restricting protected targeted advertisements. Further, this paper will argue that SOPIPA
should at least have the following exceptions, many of which have been incorporated into subsequently enacted state student privacy laws throughout the
country. First, targeted advertising should at least be permitted to be student
“Users,” ages 13 and over, of Operator run “K-12 School Purpose” services, to
adult “Users” of Operator run “K-12 School Purpose” services. Second, these
advertisements should at least be permitted to be presented to “Users” when
they are off of the educational platform (e.g. not presented in the platform).
Third, targeted advertising should be permissible, at least, when it only uses,
but does not disclose, a “User’s” personal information for targeted advertising.
Fourth, targeted advertising should be able to serve advertisements based on
non-personal “User” information. Fifth, the categories of permissible targeted
advertising should at least be extended to protected commercial advertisements
related to education, jobs, and politics. Finally, whenever this article refers to
students below, a student is defined as age 13 through 17. Students ages 18 and
over will be considered adults.
B. Substantial Government Interest
Under the Central Hudson test, the government’s interest in restricting protected commercial speech must be substantial.87 California’s interest in creating
the targeted advertising ban is best understood when broken down into two
categories. The first category is California’s interest in protecting the privacy
of student information. The second category is California’s interest in preventing the commercial exploitation of students, and preserving the educational
atmosphere in schools. The second category will be referred to below as the
“Commercial Interest.”
C. California’s Privacy Interest
What does it mean to have an interest in privacy? Informational privacy
conventionally concerns an individual’s control over the processing (i.e. collection, disclosure, and use) of his or her personal information. SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban seeks to protect the privacy of student information by
creating a prohibition on the disclosure, of student information, or any other
information (i.e. parent or teacher information) collected by the operator
through the use of its “K-12 School Purposes” service for targeted advertising
87 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
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purposes. There is extensive evidence that, in both the legislative history88 and
the public discourse,89 by creating SOPIPA the California state legislature intended to curb the dissemination of personal student information, especially for
non-educational purposes.
The Supreme Court is likely to hold that as a general principle, limiting the
dissemination of personal student information collected by operators, especially for targeted advertising and other commercial purposes, is a substantial interest.90 First, student personal information can include sensitive categories of
information, e.g. information related to a student’s health, disabilities, behavioral problems, past indiscretions, or performance indicators.91 Intentional or
unintentional disclosure of sensitive student information could result in negative externalities for students.92 For example, concerns have been raised sur88 S. Judic. Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., at 54 (Cal. 2014)
(“This bill seeks to protect the personal information of students by generally prohibiting the
operator of an Internet Web site, service or application that is used, designed and marketed
for K-12 school purposes from sharing, disclosing, or compiling personal information about
a student for any purpose other than the K-12 school purpose.”).
89 Tanya Roscorla, Student Data Privacy Bill Would Close a Loophole in Current Law,
CTR. FOR DIGITAL EDUC. (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.centerdigitaled.com/news/StudentData-Privacy-Bill-California.html; Benjamin Herold, supra note 10; Common Sense Applauds California Governor Jerry Brown for Signing Landmark Student Privacy Law,
COMMON SENSE MEDIA (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/aboutus/news/press-releases/common-sense-applauds-california-governor-jerry-brown-forsigning; Alex Bradshaw, California Takes a Meaningful Step Toward Shoring Up Student
Privacy, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 30, 2014), https://cdt.org/blog/californiatakes-meaningful-step-toward-shoring-up-student-privacy/.
90 The topic of student privacy has become relevant in various jurisdictions over the past
couple of decades, and may be approaching the time where it has become ripe for adjudication by the U.S. Supreme Court. See W.A. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 14CV-8093, 2016 WL 1274587, at *1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (discussing the case of
W.E., a seventeen year old student afflicted with a medical disability whose medical condition was “released into the community” after W.E.’s parents sought reimbursement for
school expenses from the school district. The court held that W.E. had a “viable privacy
interest” in not having his medical information released into the community); See also N.C.
v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 348 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that in a case
where a student had been sexually abused while in the 7th grade, the student had a protected
privacy interest in the confidentiality of that information, but that privacy interest had to be
weighed against the professional interest of the school district and its employees to ascertain
whether the sharing of the information was a “substantial interest”.).
91 S. Judic. Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2014)
(“Many companies provide online services to aide classroom teaching but they require students to create accounts that capture contact data and personal academic information such as
grades, disciplinary history, and chat records. In some instances, companies are mining data
from schoolchildren beyond the needs of the classroom.”).
92 Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Raped on Campus? Don’t Trust Your College to Do the
Right Thing, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Raped-on-Campus-Don-t-Trust/228093/ (examining the
case of a rape victim whose therapy records were disclosed by the University of Oregon to
the university’s general counsel’s office to be used in a lawsuit brought against the victim,
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rounding the potential risk of discrimination from having sensitive information
disclosed to jobs or schools to which students would like to apply. Additionally, SOPIPA’s legislative history warned that “[s]ome Apps marketed to teachers and kids could track a child’s physical location.”93 Further, as sensitive information is disclosed to more parties there is a greater risk of sensitive information being inadvertently disclosed or hacked.94
Unfortunately, without the proper training, students, when creating or entering personal information into a platform, are unlikely to fully understand or be
able to prevent the future consequences of an online “permanent” information
record. An online information record can be “permanent” in the sense that it is
very difficult to control or delete information once it is disclosed online to third
parties.
Thus, through limiting the disclosure of personal student information, California is attempting to preserve the notion that schools should be safe places
where students can struggle and fail without fear of future repercussions. In
addition, that schools should be structured to acknowledge that students learn
at least as much from their failures as their successes, and that student’s change
and shouldn’t have to live in fear that past indiscretions will define their future.
California believes that the best way to achieve these aims is to maintain
schools as havens for education and wall them off from the outside commercial
world.95
To date, Congress has passed three laws, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”),96 the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”),97 and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (“PPRA”),98 that
among other functions, advance similar privacy interests of protecting the personal information of children and students. COPPA, FERPA and the PPRA
have been around respectively for 15, 41, and 37 years.99 They have yet to be
successfully challenged on the legitimacy of their general interest of limiting
the dissemination of personal student and child information, as opposed to
their specific prohibitions or requirements.100
who has filed action against the university for mishandling the investigation).
93 S. Judic. Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2014).
94 Nena Giandomenico & Julia de Groot, Insider v. Outsider Data Security Threats:
What’s the Greater Risk?, DIGITAL GUARDIAN, https://digitalguardian.com/blog/insideroutsider-data-security-threats (last updated Sept. 13, 2016).
95 CAL. S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF S. NO. 1177, 2013-2014 REG. SESS., S.
1177, at 5 (2014).
96 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501-06 (1998).
97 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2013).
98 Protection of Pupil Rights, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (2002).
99 15 U.S.C. § 6501; 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232h.
100 Protecting Student Privacy While Using Online Educational Services: Requirements
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In contrast to personal student information, it is less clear whether the Court
would hold that California has a substantial interest in curbing the dissemination of non-personal information for targeted advertising purposes. For example, it is unlikely that California has a substantial privacy interest in curbing
the dissemination of aggregate student information because it does not reveal
personal information, i.e. the type of information that triggers privacy harms.
Specifically, the process of aggregation only leaves the viewer of the information with a list of population level statistics, compared to a list of individual
consumer profiles. For example, aggregated student information in the school
context would most likely be in the form of lists of the number of students in a
specific school that took Algebra, or the number of students that received “B”
grades. Aggregated lists would not reveal which students took Algebra or received “B” grades. Thus, aggregation is unlikely to provide sufficient information to trace back to an individual student.101 Even COPPA drew it’s age line
at 13, indicating that the government has less of an interest in dictating how
personal information of children ages 13 and over should be regulated.102 In
fact, under COPPA non-personal child information may be used for commercial purposes.103
It is also unlikely that California has a substantial privacy interest in curbing
the dissemination of information collected from adult “Users,” e.g. parents or
teachers. Currently, there are very few laws that completely prohibit the dissemination of adult information for advertising purposes.104 Instead, privacy
laws pertaining to adult advertising typically focus on requiring advertisers to
provide adults with the proper notice and consent that their information will be
used for advertising purposes.105

and Past Practices, PRIVACY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER 1, 4, 6, 8 (2014),
https://tech.ed.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Student-Privacy-and-Online-EducationalServices-February-2014.pdf.
101 However, there can be a small risk of de-identification. E.g. in Small School Communities. Supra note 54, at 3.
102 Stephen J. Astringer, The Endless Bummer: California’s Latest Attempt to Protect
Children Online Is Far Out(Side) Effective, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 271,
273 (2015).
103 15 U.S.C. § 6501.
104 Astringer, supra note 103, at 282-83 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874
(1997)).
105 See generally FED. TRADE COMM., 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE
(2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf (highlighting the FTC’s support to the “notice
and consent” method of data collecting as a way of protecting consumer privacy in the era
of “Big Data”).
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D. California’s Commercial Interest
SOPIPA’s legislative history contains extensive evidence of California’s intent to prohibit targeted advertising in order to prevent the commercial exploitation of students, and preserve the educational atmosphere in schools.106 The
California Senate Judiciary Committee Bill Analysis states that “when students
are using these [Operator K-12 School Purposes] sites for school purposes,
their time on these sites should be for learning, not advertising. Children are
especially impressionable, particularly at younger ages.”107 As a general principle the Commercial Interest is likely to be upheld by the Supreme Court as a
significant interest. For example, in Board of Trustees of State University of
New York v. Fox, the Supreme Court held that “promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere on SUNY’s campuses, promoting safety and
security, preventing commercial exploitation of students, and preserving residential tranquility,” were substantial government interests.108
SOPIPA attempts to advance the “Commercial Interest” by prohibiting targeted advertisements to students that use school-directed educational services
in the classroom or at home.109 SOPIPA bans all targeted advertisements regardless of their content (i.e. both advertisements with commercial or political
content), and the Court is likely to hold that California has a significant interest
in prohibiting targeted advertising to students regarding products and services
that have been shown to harm students or are illegal for students under the age
of 18 to consume.110 For example, studies have shown that advertising vice
goods, such as tobacco and alcohol, to children at a young age can increase
their consumption of these products and at younger ages.111 Consequently, ad106 CAL. S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF S. NO. 1177, 2013-2014 REG. SESS., S.
1177, at 5 (2014).
107 CAL. S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF S. NO. 1177, 2013-2014 REG. SESS., S.
1177, at 8 (2014).
108 Bd. of Tr. of St. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989).
109 Limited to services that fall within the definitional scope of the Operator and “K-12
School Purposes” definitions. CAL. S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF S. NO. 1177,
2013-2014 REG. SESS., S. 1177, at 7-8 (2014).
110 See Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 590 (4th
Cir. 2010) (sustaining Virginia limits on alcoholic beverage ads in campus journals to combat underage drinking. The Court held the regulation directly and materially advanced government’s substantial interest to decrease in demand for alcohol among college students was
sufficient to demonstrate that prohibition directly and materially advanced government’s
substantial interest in combating problem of underage and abusive drinking; and regulation
was narrowly tailored to serve Board’s interest and need not be the least restrictive alternative).
111 See Children Adolescents and Advertising, 118 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 2563, 2563
(2006), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/118/6/2563.full (discussing the detrimental effects advertising can have on adolescents while recognizing how media advertising
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vertising restrictions upheld in the school context have largely been limited to
vice goods, e.g. alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, and guns.112 In fact, California has
already outlawed advertising vice goods to children under the age of 18.113
However, the Court is less likely to hold that California has a significant interest in absolutely prohibiting targeted advertisements limited to education,
jobs, or politics. California’s interest in prohibiting such targeted advertisements is weakened if they are protected commercial speech. California’s interest is especially weakened if targeted advertisements can be filtered by schools
or parents, or their receipt can be opted out of all together – these less restrictive methods are discussed below. The Court has held that government fear
that if the commercial information is divulged to the public, the public will
make “bad decisions” is not a legitimate state objective, specifically stating:
“Fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.”114 However, this article is not
can help mitigate some of these harmful effects); Susan Villani, Impact of Media on Children and Adolescents: A 10-Year Review of the Research, 40 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 4, 392-93 (2001), http://www.jaacap.com/article/S08908567(09)60387-7/abstract?cc=y= (concluding “the primary effects of media exposure are
increased violent and aggressive behavior, increased high-risk behaviors, including alcohol
and tobacco use, and accelerated onset of sexual activity. [That] newer forms of media have
not been adequately studied, but concern is warranted through the logical extension of earlier research on other media forms and the amount of time the average child spends with increasingly sophisticated media.”).
112 See Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc., 602 F.3d at 589-90 (concluding
that the restriction on alcohol advertising in the college paper designed to reduce demand for
alcohol was “amply supported by the record”).
113 S. 568, 2013 Leg., (Cal. 2013). Prohibited an operator of an Internet Web site, online
service, online application, or mobile application, as specified, from marketing or advertising specified types of products or services to a minor; prohibited an operator from knowingly using, disclosing, compiling, or allowing a third party to use, disclose, or compile, the
personal information of a minor for the purpose of marketing or advertising specified types
of products or services; required the operator of an Internet Web site, online service, online
application, or mobile application to permit a minor, who is a registered user of the operator’s Internet Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application, to remove,
or to request and obtain removal of, content or information posted on the operator’s Internet
Web site, service, or application by the minor, as specified.
114 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670-72 (“Those who seek to censor or burden free expression
often assert that disfavored speech has adverse effects. But the ‘fear that people would make
bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify content-based burdens on
speech.”); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002); see also Virginia
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976)
(“But [Virginia] may not [issue professional standards] by keeping the public in ignorance
of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.”); Liqourmart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) ) (“The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”) (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (concluding “since we can find no meaningful distinction between Ordinance 5-1974 and the statue overturned in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., we
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advocating for the permissibility of targeting advertisements of vice goods.
Instead this article is focused on the permissibility of advertisements at least
relating to education, jobs, and politics.
The Court is also unlikely to find that students of all ages face the same level of risk of commercial exploitation. Research has shown that children under
the age of 9 are more impressionable and at a greater risk of being unfairly
persuaded by advertisements.115 The American Pediatrics Association (“APA”)
states that in order for children not to be uniquely susceptible to advertisements
they (i) must be able to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
content and (ii) must be able to recognize “that the advertiser has a perspective
different from the viewer and that advertisers intend to persuade their audience
to want to buy their products, but also that such persuasive communication is
biased, and that biased messages must be interpreted differently than unbiased
messages.”116 In the APA’s study on children’s psychological susceptibility to
advertisements they found that there is a great deal of evidence that children
under the age of 9 often “do not recognize the persuasive intent of commercial
appeals,” and children below 5 often cannot “consistently distinguish program
from commercial content.”117
It is important to clarify that this article is not intended to argue for the permissibility of sending targeted advertisements to students of all ages. Instead,
this article argues that targeted advertising should be permissible at least to
students ages 13 and over, and consequently adults. Currently there is not sufficient research to show that students over the age of 13 are uniquely susceptible advertisements and require special treatment under the law.118 For example,
when drafting the age cutoff for COPPA Congress decided that children ages
13 and over did not warrant special protection from online targeted advertisements based on their personal information.119 This article takes an evidence
based approach, arguing that targeted advertising should only be banned when
there is sufficient evidence of harm. Thus, if in the coming years there is a
wealth of research showing that students ages 13 through 17 are uniquely susceptible to advertisements, then the ban’s age range should be revisited by the
California state legislature. Regarding the risk of distraction interest to students

must conclude that this ordinance violates the First Amendment.”).
115 Report of the APA Task Force on Advertising and Children, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N (2004), http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/advertising-children.aspx.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. COMMON SENSE MEDIA, ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN AND TEENS: CURRENT PRACTICES 1, 16 (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/advertising-tochildren-and-teens-current-practices.
119 Astringer, supra note 103, at 273.
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ages 13 and over, this paper argues that targeted advertising should at least be
permitted to be presented to student “Users” off of the platform. This is discussed further below.120 However, if this statute is truly aimed at curbing commercial exploitation and distraction, it is vastly underinclusive because it
would still allow unlimited non-targeted advertisements to be presented in the
platform to students of all ages.
Finally, the Court is unlikely to hold that there is a significant interest in
preventing the commercial exploitation of adult “Users” from protected commercial speech because adults do not suffer from the same impressionability
and vulnerability concerns as children under the age of 9.121 For example, in
Edenfield v. Fane, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to prohibit Certified Public Accountants (“CPAs”) from engaging in “direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation” because it fails to advance the interests of protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching, maintaining CPA independence, and ensuring against conflicts of interest - despite the substantiality of these interests.122 The Court distinguished CPA solicitation from lawyer solicitation by
stating that CPA consumers are more sophisticated, and that lawyers, but not
CPAs, engaged in advocacy and the art of persuasion, whereas CPAs are more
independent and objective.123 Additionally, SOPIPA’s legislative history did
not offer any significant reasons why adults should be prohibited from receiving targeted advertisements. Currently, there are very few laws, if any, that
outright ban protected commercial advertisements to adults.124 Instead the more
common practice is to limit the frequency, manner, or place that these advertisements are served.125 For example, disclosure requirements are a common
practice requiring advertisers to clearly indicate that their content is an advertisement, either through banners or advertising labels.126
i. Directly Advance
The second prong of the Commercial Speech Doctrine asks whether the
challenged regulation “directly advances” the government’s interest at issue in
the regulation.127 To satisfy the “directly advance” requirement, the regulation
See infra Part IV § D(2)-E.
Brian L. Wilcox, et al., Report of the APA Task Force on Advertising and Children,
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 1, 5 (2004), http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/advertisingchildren.aspx.
122 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 761-62 (1993).
123 Id. at 762.
124 See generally supra note 3 (describing SOPIPA’s legislative history to demonstrate
the majority of bills are focused on student protection).
125 Id. at 1.
126 Brian L. Wilcox, et al., supra note 122, at 38.
127 Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013); see also
120
121
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must “significantly,” not just slightly, advance the state’s goal.128 The “directly
advance” prong places the burden on the government to establish the means of
the commercial speech restriction actually advance the proposed governmental
objective.129 The Court has held that the government’s burden is “not satisfied
by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”130 For example, in Brown, the Court held that the proffered evidence by
the California government was not sufficient to prove that violent video games
caused children gamers to be exhibit more violent behavior.131
The Court is likely to hold that California’s privacy interest is directly advanced by the targeted advertising ban’s prohibition on disclosing information.
Namely, the disclosure prohibition significantly advances California’s goal of
limiting the dissemination of student information for advertising purposes by
absolutely prohibiting such dissemination. However, the Court is less likely to
hold that the prohibition on using, without disclosing, information for targeted
advertising purposes directly advances SOPIPA’s privacy interest. As mentioned above, operators are currently able to use information, even personal
information, to serve targeted advertisements without disclosing that information to advertisers.132 Thus if “User” personal information is only used and
not disclosed, “Users” are less likely to suffer a privacy harm because third
parties are not receiving personal information on “Users.”
Additionally, the Court is unlikely to hold that prohibiting targeted advertising that is triggered by non-personal information would directly advance California’s privacy interest. As mentioned above, SOPIPA does not only prohibit
targeted advertisements based on personal information collected from its users,
but also prohibits targeted advertisements based on “any information,” including de-identified and aggregated information.133 However, California has a
lesser interest in limiting the dissemination of non-personal information for the
purposes of targeted advertising. Limiting non-personal information has a negligible effect on promoting privacy because by definition such information
cannot be used to personally identify an individual user. Thus, the notion of a

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 539 (2001) (“The State’s interest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and even compelling, but it is no less true that the
sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity.”).
128 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505-06 (1996).
129 Id. at 505.
130 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
131 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (2011).
132 Supra note 54, at 1-2.
133 S.B. 1177, Reg. Sess. 2013-2014 (Cal. 2014).
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privacy harm necessitates the revelation of information specifically tied to an
individual. The inability to identify an individual user assumes that the operator used proper de-identification methods to remove personal identifiers from
personal information. However, even if information is de-identified or aggregated properly, in some cases there can be a small risk of re-identification.134
Further, SOPIPA’s legislative history supports the notion that the targeted advertising ban’s focus should be on personal information, and that the harms
associated with privacy relate to personally identifiable information.135 The
legislative history is silent on any significant privacy risks posed by the dissemination of non-personal information.136 Thus, the ban’s information trigger
is overly broad, and should instead be limited to personal information.
In contrast, the Court is likely to hold that the California’s “Commercial Interest” is directly advanced by SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban. First, the
ban helps to prevent the commercial exploitation of students by limiting the
number of commercial ads that students view. Specifically, the ban prohibits
tailored commercial ads to students, which are more likely to be enticing because they are based on student interests (gleamed from personal information).137 However, the extent to which targeted ads exploit students commercially, or cause the commercialization of schools arguably can depend on the
manner in which the advertisements are displayed (e.g. with a banner labeling
the content as an ad) or their content (e.g. educational and political ads may be
less harmful than cigarette and junk food ads). Additionally, banning targeted
advertisements helps to preserve a school’s educational atmosphere by allowing users to focus on the educational content provided by “K-12 School Purposes” services. However, the fact that SOPIPA does not ban advertising that
is not based on information collected from “Users” sheds doubt on how effective the statute is at limiting the commercialization of education. In other
words, this statute would still allow non-targeted advertisements to be displayed in the education technology service to students of all ages.
ii. No More Extensive Than Necessary
The third and final prong of the commercial speech analysis requires that the
regulation be “not more extensive than necessary” to achieve the government’s
Supra note 54, at 2.
S.B. 1177, Reg. Sess. 2013-2014 (Cal. 2014).
136 See Id. (describing protection of personal information without identifying the effect
of privacy on non-personal information).
137 See COMMON SENSE MEDIA, ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN AND TEENS: CURRENT PRACTICES 12 (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/advertising-tochildren-and-teens-current-practices (describing how one advantage of social media is the
ability to target messages to children and teens based on their interests.)
134
135
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objective.138 The Court will not hesitate to strike down the restriction if is convinced that there is some alternative method of achieving the same end, as well
or almost as well, and with significantly less interference with protected
speech. The government generally has the burden of showing that lessrestrictive alternatives would not adequately fulfill the government’s alleged
objective.139
SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban is unconstitutionally more restrictive
than necessary because (1) the ban prohibits targeting advertisements to adult
“Users” (e.g. teachers, parents, or school administrators); (2) the ban prohibits
targeting advertisements off of the operator’s “K-12 School Purposes” platform; and (3) because parents should be able to decide what content their children view (especially when the content is not obscene, illegal, or deceptive).
Fortunately, there are alternative methods of achieving California’s objectives,
at least as well, and with significantly less interference with protected commercial speech. Less restrictive alternatives include: (4) allowing adult “Users”
and students to consent (e.g. opt-in) to receiving targeted advertisements; (5)
filtering tools that allow schools or parents to filter the type and/or number of
targeted advertisements received by student and adult “Users;” and (6) by deferring to industry self-regulatory regimes.
E. SOPIPA’s Ban Should Not Prohibit Targeted Advertisements to Adult
Users
SOPIPA not only prohibits targeting advertisements to students based on
any student information collected through an operator’s “K-12 School Purposes” service, but also prohibits targeting advertisements to any other “User”
(e.g. teachers, parents or school administrators) based on any student information, or any “User” information collected through the operator’s “K-12
School Purposes” service. For example, if a teacher uses a service regulated by
SOPIPA, an operator cannot target any advertisements to the teacher based on
any information the operator has collected from the teacher.
When analyzing broad statutes intended for minors that also capture adults,
the Courts have valued the rights of adults to receive information.140 Consequently, Supreme Court case law has often held that if the government’s principal justification for regulating speech is to prevent minors from gaining access to, or being enticed by, a “vice” product, the government must tailor its
138 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Service Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
139 See Thompson v. Western States Med. Center, 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
140 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).

2017] TARGETED ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

51

methods very tightly so that there is no undue interference with the rights of
adults to obtain or learn about the product.141 For example, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, Massachusetts tried to dramatically restrict the advertising of
smokeless tobacco and cigars by forbidding billboard advertisements within
1,000 feet of a school or playground.142 The advertising ban was so broad that
the Court stated that it constituted a nearly complete ban in some metropolitan
areas, unduly impinging sellers’ opportunity to propose legal transactions with
adults.143 The state defended the restriction on the grounds that it would protect
minors from being attracted to the product.144 However, the Court held that the
regulation violated the free-speech rights of the tobacco industry and its adult
customers because “the governmental interest in protecting children from
harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech addressed to adults.”145 Further, in Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union
and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union the Supreme Court struck
down bans on putting non-obscene, “indecent” material in any place where
minors might see it, because adults have a right to see the material and the ban
would dissuade people from making the material broadly available.146
Courts have also struck down advertising bans in the higher education context as overly broad when advertisements have unconstitutionally interfered
with an adult’s right to receive information. In Educ. Media Co. at Virginia
Tech, Inc. v. Insley, the Court struck down a ban on alcohol advertisements in
college newspapers even though there was a significant government interest in
curtailing underage drinking.147 The Court reasoned that the ban was more restrictive than necessary because it prohibited large numbers of those who were
able to legally consume alcohol from receiving truthful information.148 Similarly, in Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 191 (3d Cir. 2004), the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting advertisers from paying for alcoholic beverage advertisements distributed by communications media affiliated with educational
institutions. The Court held that the statute failed to directly advance, and was
not “adequately tailored to achieve”, asserted government interests.149 Thus, the
statute violated the commercial speech doctrine by interfering with the free
speech rights of a student-run university newspaper and by imposing a finan-

Reilly, 533 U.S. at 564.
Id. at 534-35.
143 Id. at 562.
144 Id. at 561.
145 Id. at 564 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 875).
146 Reno, 521 U.S. at 883; Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 672
(2004).
147 Educ. Media Company at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 2013).
148 Id.
149 Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2004).
141
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cial burden on media.150
SOPIPA was similarly intended to focus on minors (i.e. students) by prohibiting their access to targeted advertisements.151 The law is aptly named the
“Student Online Personal Information Protection Act.” However, as applied,
the targeted advertising ban goes beyond SOPIPA’s legislative intent to protect
students from targeted advertisements. Instead, the statute regulates advertising
in a way that interferes materially with the legitimate rights of operators, advertisers, and adult “Users” to exchange truthful information. California’s proclaimed Commercial Interest (e.g. protecting students from commercial exploitation and maintain an educational atmosphere) cannot be used to justify a ban
on targeted advertisements to adult “Users.” Further, compared to older forms
of media such as newspapers and magazines, internet media has the technological advantage of being able to distinguish/differentiate between adult and
children users through age verification. Online platforms can create requirements where users must authenticate their age before being able to login to
their account.152 Thus online platforms can choose to only serve advertisements, or certain advertisements, to “Users” above a certain age. Although
there are limits to the effectiveness of age verification, the user can easily fabricate their age.153 Age verification, where the burden is on the advertisers to
wall off advertisements from “Users” under a specified age, is a less restrictive
means to achieving California’s Commercial and Privacy Interests. However,
in Ashcroft, even an age verification regime was held to be unconstitutionally
more restrictive than a filtering regime.154 Discussed more below, in a filtering
regime, parents or schools can obtain software that filters out content (e.g. advertisements or certain websites) that they do not want students to access.155
The Court reasoned that a filter could simply be turned off whenever the adult
wanted to use the computer, and thus did not overly burden an adult’s right to
receive information.156
Finally, in contrast to SOPIPA, there are many other states, including Arkansas,157 Georgia,158 Maine,159 and Nevada,160 that have passed student privacy
Id. at 113.
S.B. 1177, Reg. Sess. 2013-2014 (Cal. 2014).
152 Id.
153 See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 657, 667-68 (2004) (explaining how minors can circumvent age verification systems when they have access to their
own credit card, because they do not need parental permission to visit certain websites or
make certain purchases online).
154 Id. at 656.
155 Id. at 667.
156 Id.
157 H.B. 1961, 90th General Assemb. (Ark. 2015).
158 S.B. 89, 153rd General Assemb. (Ga. 2015).
150
151
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laws with narrower targeted advertising bans. These laws have included much
narrower information triggers that are tailored only to personal student information, instead of adopting SOPIPA’s broader trigger that could include adult
“User” information.161 Thus the Supreme Court is likely to hold that SOPIPA’s
targeted advertising ban when applied to adults is more restrictive than necessary to achieve its objective, and that there are significantly less restrictive alternatives such as age verification regimes, filtering software (discussed below), or a narrowing of the ban’s information trigger.
F. Targeting Advertising On vs. Off Platform
SOPIPA prohibits targeted advertisements that are presented on an “Operator’s” “K-12 School Purposes” service or off of the service. For example,
without the ban, “Operators” could serve targeted advertisements, based on
information collected through the Operator’s “K-12 School Purposes” service,
on other websites such as CNN (i.e. off of the education platform).162 However,
California has a weaker Commercial Interest in prohibiting targeted advertisements that are served to student or adult “Users” off of the “Operator’s” “K-12
School Purposes” platform.163 Off-platform advertisements do not pose the
same threat of commercializing education or distracting students from their
studies because they are not being served on the educational platform. Further,
students are already legally inundated with targeted advertisements all over the
internet. Thus allowing “operators” to participate in serving off-platform targeted advertisements would pose no sufficiently greater harm to California’s
Commercial Interest than the current targeted advertising world to which students are exposed.
The Courts have struck down commercial speech bans where the government’s means in achieving its interest were not found to be consistently rational.164 For example, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court invalidated a federal statute prohibiting beer manufacturers from listing their beverage’s alcohol
content on the label.165 The federal government defended the ban on the
grounds of attempting to prevent brewers from engaging in “strength wars,” in
S. Proposal 183, 127th Legis. (Me. 2015).
S.B. 463, 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015).
161 H.B. 1961, 90th General Assemb. (Ark. 2015); S.B. 89 (Ga. 2015); S. Proposal 183,
127th Legis. (Me. 2015); S.B. 463, 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015).
162 See Getting Started with the Facebook Pixel, FACEBOOK.COM,
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-pixel/using-the-pixel (last visited Nov. 15,
2016) (explaining how certain websites allow tracking of user content).
163 Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1177 (2014 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Apr. 21, 2014, 4-5.
164 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995).
165 Id.
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which each maker increases its beer’s alcohol content and then tries to lure
drinkers by promoting the high content.166 However, the federal government
did not prohibit alcohol strength listings in advertising, only on labels.167 Similarly, the government didn’t ban such listings for the labels of wines and spirits, only beer.168 Thus the Court held that these inconsistencies make the
scheme so irrational that it does not “directly and materially advance” the objective of preventing strength wars.169 Similarly, SOPIPA’s means for achieving California’s commercial interest are not consistently rational. If the California legislature truly wanted to prevent the harm of commercializing education and distracting students from their studies, then SOPIPA should ban all
advertising on an “Operator’s” “K-12 School Purposes” platform, including
ads not targeted based on information collected through the “Operator’s” platform. However, the targeted advertising ban is arguably not inclusive because
it only bans targeted advertisements based on information gathered through the
“Operator’s” platform.
G. SOPIPA’s Paternalism Regarding “User” Choice
SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban has a paternalistic approach because it (i)
prohibits parents from being able to decide how their own information, or their
children’s information, can be used or disclosed, and (ii) prohibits parents from
being able to decide what legal content is permissible to view themselves or for
their children to view. The Supreme Court has struck down paternalistic
speech bans as being overinclusive in areas where parents should have the
right to decide what protected commercial speech their children should have
access to, and where parents can have reasonably differing views on the permissibility of the content.170 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the
Supreme Court struck down, as violating the First Amendment, a California
law that restricted the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.171 During
the narrowly tailored analysis, the Court stated that “as a means of assisting
parents the Act is greatly overinclusive, since not all of the children who are
prohibited from purchasing violent video games have parents who disapprove
of their doing so…[and] the Act’s purported aid to parental authority is vastly
overinclusive. Not all of the children who are forbidden to purchase violent
video games on their own have parents who care whether they purchase vio166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 476.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 488.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
Id.
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lent video games. While some of the legislation’s effect may indeed be in support of what some parents of the restricted children actually want, its entire
effect is only in support of what the State thinks parents ought to want. This is
not the narrow tailoring to “assisting parents” that restriction of First Amendment rights requires.”172
Applying Brown’s standard to SOPIPA, the Supreme Court would likely
conclude that parents can have differing views on the importance of protecting
the privacy of their child’s information. For example, currently parents differ
on how much they permit their children to share personal information on the
internet. Parents enforce differing privacy preferences through parental control
filters, device (e.g. computer, tablet, mobile) passwords, or household rules.
Thus, when there are reasonably differing views on legal activity, parents are
in the best position to judge, at the very least, what legal activity they should
be able to opt their child into (e.g. consent to). For example, in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., the Supreme Court stated that “Vermont’s law [limiting the use of
personal information for marketing] might burden less speech if it came into
the operation only after an individual choice.”173
Similarly, the Supreme Court would likely rule that parents can hold differing views on the value or harm posed by targeted advertisements for products
and services that their children can legally consume, as opposed to agerestricted products like alcohol and cigarettes. Many parents may view the
permissibility of advertisements as more of an issue of the content or quantity
of advertisements, compared to an absolute value judgment on whether targeted advertisements as a whole are beneficial or harmful. For example, many
parents may view the targeted advertising of certain products, like junk food or
cigarettes, as harmful and habit forming, while they could view many educational advertisements as informative, and would want to opt in (e.g. consent) to
their provision. Additionally, some parents may want to opt into receiving targeted advertisements if it would result in lower prices for their children’s educational services, which could disproportionately help low-income school districts and parents. However, even if parents view certain legal informationaladvertisements as objectionable, the Court may still strike down overly restrictive bans.174

Id.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
174 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983) (holding that
the “statute prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements could not be
justified under the First Amendment… on the ground that it shielded recipients of mail from
materials that they were likely to find offensive, since the recipients who found the mailings
objectionable could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes.”).
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H. Consent: Users Should Have the Right to Decide How Their Information is
Used or Disclosed
California’s Privacy and Commercial Interests can be more narrowly
achieved by providing “Users” with robust and meaningful choice about how
their personal information is used and disclosed. Currently, SOPIPA takes a
very paternalistic approach and does not grant “Users” the right to control the
use of their information or control the information they receive. However, this
lack of choice can have many unintended consequences. For example, because
the targeted advertising ban prohibits any advertisement, regardless of its content or author (e.g. NGO, corporation, or school), “Users” are not able receive
ads that they may find beneficial and informative.175 Thus, this article is arguing for an exception to the targeted advertising ban for protected commercial
speech, at least relating to education, jobs, and politics. For clarification, this
article’s consent argument is limited to allowing “Users” to opt-in to receiving
certain targeted advertisements. In contrast, this article is not arguing that
school administrators, teachers, parents or students should have absolute control of how their information is used and disclosed. For example, there may be
some situations where parents and students should not be able to delete an unfavorable exam grade.
i. Adult “User” Consent
The Supreme Court is likely to hold that granting adult “Users” the ability to
consent to (i.e. opt into) receiving targeted advertisements, based on adult “User” information, is a substantially less restrictive alternative to SOPIPA’s absolute targeted advertising ban. The Court is likely to consider the following factors in its “less restrictive alterative” analysis. First, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the value of protected commercial advertisements.176 In
Virginia Pharmacy Board, the informational value of commercial speech was a
key justification for its constitutional protection.177 The Court held that a “consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.”178 Additionally, the Court
stated that “information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
175 For example, “Users” may find the following targeted advertisements valuable: discount advertisements, political advertisements, college and career counseling advertisements, or advertisements relating to supplementary education materials and tools.
176 Va. St. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
177 Id. at 770; see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
178 Va. St. Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 763.
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own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them.”179
In Sorrell, the Court reiterated the importance of protecting informational, in
contrast to deceptive and misleading, commercial speech.180 Additionally, the
Court stated that “Vermont’s law [limiting the use of personal information for
marketing] might burden less speech if it came into the operation only after an
individual choice.”181 Consequently, Virginia Pharmacy Bd. and Sorrell arguably suggest that it would be very difficult for commercial speech restrictions to
survive Supreme Court review if they restrict protected informational advertising for a legal product.182 Six justices, including Justice Sotomayor, signed the
2011 majority opinion in Sorrell, signaling that a stable majority of the court is
highly skeptical of commercial speech that it views as paternalistic.183 Regarding SOPIPA, although the ban prohibits targeted advertisements that may be
deceptive, misleading or illegal, SOPIPA also bans protected informational
targeted advertisements. Even without SOPIPA, however, such deceptive and
misleading advertisements are illegal under California and Federal law,184 and
are regularly prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission185 and the 50 State
Attorneys General offices.
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment includes not only a right to free speech, but also a right to receive protected
commercial information.186 Thus, the Court would apply careful scrutiny to
preserve the rights of adult “Users” to receive protected commercial advertisements. For example, Lorillard, Reno, and Ashcroft all suggest that the
Court would strike down restrictions on protected commercial speech where
the restriction is aimed at protecting minors but is so broad that it significantly
restricts the ability of adults to receive the same speech.187 Thus, the Court is
Id. at 770.
Sorrell, 131 U.S. at 2669; Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First
Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 497, 511-13 (2015) (explaining that in Sorrell, the Court struck
down a Vermont law that limited the sale and use of pharmacy records that identified the
prescribing physician. “Under the law, pharmaceutical marketers were barred from using
this factual information for commercial purposes… The Court emphasized that many doctors (the most relevant consumers in this case), found the pharmaceutical detailing [e.g.
pharmaceutical representatives advertising drugs to doctors] based on the restricted information to be “instructive” and “very helpful.”).
181 Sorrell, 131 U.S. at 2669.
182 Id. at 2670-71.
183 Id. at 2653.
184 Carolyn L. Carter, supra note 80.
185 Division of Advertising Practices, supra note 80.
186 Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
187 Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665-66 (2004); Reilly, 533 U.S. at 564;
179
180
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likely to find an adult “User” consent exception to the targeted advertising ban
to be a sufficiently less restrictive alternative.
a. Parental Consent for Student “Users”
The Court is also likely hold that granting parents the ability to consent to
their children/students receiving protected targeted advertisements based on
student “User” information is a substantially less restrictive alternative to
SOPIPA’s absolute targeted advertising ban. The Court is likely to consider the
following factors in its “less restrictive alternative” analysis. First, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of limiting
restrictions on protected commercial advertising.188
Second, a consumer’s right to receive information isn’t limited to adults.
The Supreme Court has also recognized a child’s interest in receiving information. In the Internet context, the Supreme Court has been unfavorable to
content-based restrictions, even if aimed towards the protection of children.189
Recently, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute that prohibited
the sale of violent video games to minors.190 The Court reasoned that a State
may have “legitimate power to protect children from harm” but it “does not
include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be
exposed.”191 Third, as mentioned above, Brown arguably protects a parent’s
right to decide what protected commercial speech is permissible for their children to view.192
Fourth, state legislatures around the country have recognized the need to
give parents or students the ability, and right, to make choices about the use of
“User” information and to obtain the benefits of these choices.193 For example,
Arkansas,194 Georgia,195 Maine196 and Maryland197 have all passed student inReno, 521 U.S. at 879-80.
188 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
189 Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77.
190 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2729.
191 Id. at 2736; see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)
(holding that “only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government
bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.” The Court went on to say
“[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative
body thinks unsuitable for them.”).
192 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
193 Often these states used SOPIPA as their initial draft and revised it to address the major shortfalls resulting from the lack of consent exceptions.
194 H.B.1961, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015).
195 S.B. 89, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
196 S.B. 183, 127th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015).
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formation privacy laws similar to SOPIPA. However, they have all adopted
consent language similar to the following: “This Act shall not limit the ability
of an operator to use or disclose covered information with the affirmative consent of the student’s parent or guardian, or a student, when consent is given in
response to clear and conspicuous notice of the use or disclosure.” Affirmative
consent is the gold standard in privacy law and is found in all major federal
child and student privacy statutes, including COPPA,198 FERPA,199 and the
PPRA.200 Further, “clear and conspicuous” notice is a strong standard that requires prominent notice without specifying things like color/font/font size. The
lack of specification is important because it is impossible to craft a single set of
standards that will make sense both across surfaces (e.g. laptop, TV monitor,
tablet, or mobile screen) and across various types of experiences students could
have on those surfaces. Thus, the “clear and conspicuous” standard is appropriately flexible. At the same time, the FTC has created extensive guidance201
on what “clear and conspicuous” means in practice.
Finally, students, ages 13-17, should be granted some degree of choice over
the use and disclosure of their data. There is already federal precedent for a 13
and over age cutoff in COPPA. When passing COPPA, Congress made the
decision that children ages 13 and over do not require parental consent, but
instead can make their own decisions about how personal information is collected online from commercial companies and used for targeted advertising.
ii. Contract Negotiation and Filtering
Currently, even without SOPIPA, schools can limit what information is given to “Operators” and under what circumstances “Operators” can use and disclose information.202 Many schools already place limitations on “Operators”
through contracting. There is no law that requires a school to sell or disclose
personal student information to an operator’s service without any limitations
(e.g., targeted advertising limitations). Additionally, nothing requires a school
to adopt a specific “K-12 School Purposes” platform. The Supreme Court in
Sorrell found the ability to reject solicitation persuasive as a less restrictive
H.B. 298, 435th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015).
15 U.S.C. § 6501(9) (1998).
199 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002).
200 Id. at § 1232h.
201 FED. TRADE COMM., .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN
DIGITAL ADVERTISING 6-7 (Mar. 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-staff-revises-onlineadvertising-disclosure-guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf.
202 Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FTC.GOV,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequentlyasked-questions#Requirement to Limit (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
197
198
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alternative, where the recipients of such speech had many options at their disposal to reject or limit the speech in question.203 Regarding targeted advertising,
schools have such ability to reject or limit speech. Schools can and do negotiate for contract provisions banning the use of student personal information for
advertising. For example, two of the biggest “K-12 School Purposes” service
providers (Google and Apple), have similar provisions standard in their contracts.204
Instead of banning advertising outright, schools can also dictate advertising
terms to operators. One method could involve schools requiring prior approval
for targeted advertisements that would be served on contracted “K-12 School
Purposes” services. For example, schools could contractually require that certain subject matter targeted ads cannot use student personal information (e.g.,
ads relating to cigarettes, alcohol, or junk food). With the current state of technology, one could imagine a “filtering” portal where a school administrator, or
even parent, simply unchecks boxes (e.g., denying) for ads that they don’t view
as permissible. Operators can also be required to abide by strict requirements
on how advertisements are presented, for example, requiring ads to be framed
with prominent borders and captions that distinguish the advertisement and the
advertisement’s author from other types of content on the platform. Such advertising disclosure requirements represent less restrictive alternatives because
they (i) are already common in the advertising industry, (ii) wouldn’t be diffi203

Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 575.
The State also contends that § 4631(d) protects doctors from “harassing
sales behaviors.” 2007 Vt. Laws No. 80, § 1(28). “Some doctors in
Vermont are experiencing an undesired increase in the aggressiveness of
pharmaceutical sales representatives,” the Vermont Legislature found,
“and a few have reported that they felt coerced and harassed.” § 1(20). It
is doubtful that concern for “a few” physicians who may have “felt coerced and harassed” by pharmaceutical marketers can sustain a broad
content-based rule like § 4631(d). Many are those who must endure
speech they do not like, but that is a necessary cost of freedom. (citations omitted).… Physicians can, and often do, simply decline to meet
with detailers, including detailers who use prescriber-identifying information. See, e.g., App. 180, *2670 333–334. Doctors who wish to forgo
detailing altogether are free to give “No Solicitation” or “No Detailing”
instructions to their office managers or to receptionists at their places of
work. Personal privacy even in one’s own home receives “ample protection” from the “resident’s unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors.” (citations omitted). A physician’s
office is no more private and is entitled to no greater protection.

Id.
204 Google Apps for Education (Online) Agreement, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/apps/intl/en/terms/education_terms.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2016); Apple ID and Family Sharing Disclosure, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/parent-disclosure/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
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cult to implement, and (iii) would help to mitigate concerns regarding the risk
of misleading students or other consumers with advertisements that look like
educational content.205
In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld a filtering approach as a less restrictive alternative and struck down the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”),
which made it a crime to put on the Web content considered “harmful to minors.”206 The Court held that using filtering technology was not shown to be
less effective by the government. In particular, the Court focused on “blocking
and filtering software” that could voluntarily be installed by users on their own
computers. Such filtering software would clearly be less restrictive than the
age-verification scheme required by COPA; for instance, an adult with children
could simply turn off the filter when the adult wanted to use the computer. Additionally, the Court stated that user-installed filters might well prove more
effective than COPA, for example, filters could block foreign-hosted material
(which COPA could not effectively reach).207 Thus, the Court is likely to hold
that filters that can prohibit all or certain targeted advertisements from being
served to students (which can be controlled by the school or parents), are sufficiently less restrictive alternatives to SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban.
iii. Privacy & Targeted Advertising Self-Regulatory Regimes
The Student Privacy Pledge (“Pledge”) also represents a less restrictive alternative to SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban, and substantially serves to directly advance SOPIPA’s Privacy and Commercial Interests.208 The Pledge is a
list of privacy and security promises regarding the use and disclosure of personal student information by school service providers.209 The school service
provider definition210 in the Pledge covers an overlapping group of entities reg205 See supra note 202, at 7 (describing the factors advertisers consider when evaluating
whether a particular disclosure is clear and conspicuous).
206 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668.
207 Id. at 666-67.
208 STUDENT PRIVACY PLEDGE, K-12 SCHOOL SERVICE PROVIDER PLEDGE TO SAFEGUARD
STUDENT PRIVACY 1.0 (2004), https://studentprivacypledge.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Student-Privacy-Pledge-V1.pdf.
209 Id.
210 Id.
‘School service provider’ refers to any entity that: (1) is providing, and
is operating in its capacity as a provider of, an online or mobile application, online service or website that is both designed and marketed for
use in United States elementary and secondary educational institutions/
agencies and is used at the direction of their teachers or other employees; and (2) collects, maintains or uses student personal information in
digital/electronic format. The term ‘school service provider’ does not
include an entity that is providing, and that is operating in its capacity as
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ulated by the “Operator” and “K-12 School Purposes” definitions. The Pledge
was developed by the Future of Privacy Forum and the Software & Information Industry Association with guidance from school service providers, educator organizations, and other education stakeholders following a convening by
United States Representatives Jared Polis (CO) and Luke Messer (IN).211 In
less than two years the Pledge has been signed by over 200 ETCs, including
major actors such as Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft.212 The Pledge has
become a standard industry best practice for promoting student privacy, and a
major tool to vet and rate companies on their commitment to student privacy.213
The Pledge has even been endorsed by President Barack Obama.214 In addition
to outlining privacy promises, the Pledge has potential legal and public relations enforcement teeth. The Pledge can be enforced both the 50 State Attorneys’ General and the FTC under their authority to enforce against “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”215 Enforcing privacy
promises within the pledge could be most easily analogized to enforcing privacy promises listed in a company’s privacy policy.216 For example, if a Pledge
signatory targeted advertisements using a student’s personal information in
violation of the Pledge, the FTC could investigate the company for unfair and
deceptive practices.217
a provider of, general audience software, applications, services or websites not designed and marketed for schools.
Id.
Id.
Signatories, STUDENT PRIVACY PLEDGE, https://studentprivacypledge.org/signatories/
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
213 Alistair Barr, Why Google Didn’t Sign Obama-Backed Student Privacy Pledge, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/13/why-google-didnt-signobama-backed-student-privacy-pledge/.
214 Jules Polonetsky, President Obama Backs FPF-SIIA Student Privacy Pledge,
LINKEDIN (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/president-obama-backs-fpf-siiastudent-privacy-pledge-polonetsky?forceNoSplash=true.
215 Enforcing Privacy Promises: Making Sure Companies Keep Their Privacy Promises
to Consumers, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protectingconsumer-privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises (last visited Sept. 30, 2016); FED. TRADE
COMM., 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf.
216 Id.
217 Lesley Fair, Federal Trade Commission Advertising Enforcement, 1, 66, FTC.GOV
(Mar. 1, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/trainingmaterials/enforcement.pdf; See also supra note 80 (listing enforcement priorities, rules and
guides, and consumer protection initiatives of the FTC’s Division of Advertising); Anya
Kamenetz, Google Hit With A Student Privacy Complaint, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8,
2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/12/08/458460509/google-hit-with-a-studentprivacy-complaint (reporting a complaint by the Electronic Frontier Foundation alleging
211
212
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The Supreme Court has held that the means of achieving government interests are unconstitutionally restrictive when there have been robust selfregulatory programs serving similar interests.218 For example, in Brown, the
Supreme Court stated that California “cannot show that the Act’s restrictions
meet the alleged substantial need of parents who wish to restrict their children’s access to violent videos. The video-game industry’s voluntary rating
system already accomplishes that to a large extent.”219 Regarding SOPIPA, the
Pledge sufficiently addresses the California government’s Privacy and Commercial Interests, allegedly advanced by the targeted advertising ban, because
by signing the Pledge, signatories agree to: “Not use or disclose student information collected through an educational/school service (whether personal information or otherwise) for behavioral targeting of advertisements to students.”
In addition to the Pledge, the Network Advertising Initiative’s (“NAI”) Interest Based Advertising Opt-Out is a major self-regulatory regime that provides consumers the ability to not have their information used for targeted advertising purposes.220 The NAI opt-out tool was developed, in conjunction with
the Digital Advertising Alliance (“DAA”) for the express purpose of allowing
consumers to “opt out” of the Interest-Based Advertising delivered by NAI and
DAA members on Web pages using cookies.221 Interest-Based Advertising is a

Google violated the Student Privacy Pledge by not seeking parent authorization to view
browsing history of students on their chromebooks).
218 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
219 Id. California cannot show that the Act’s restrictions meet a substantial need of parents who wish to restrict their children’s access to violent video games but cannot do so.
The video-game industry has in place a voluntary rating system designed to inform consumers about the content of games. The system, implemented by the Entertainment Software
Rating Board (ESRB), assigns age-specific ratings to each video game submitted: EC (Early
Childhood); E (Everyone); E10+ (Everyone 10 and older); T (Teens); M (17 and older); and
AO (Adults Only—18 and older). App. 86. The Video Software Dealers Association encourages retailers to prominently display information about the ESRB system in their stores;
to refrain from renting or selling adults-only games to minors; and to rent or sell “M” rated
games to minors only with parental consent. Id., at 47. In 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that, as a result of this system, “the video game industry outpaces the
movie and music industries” in “(1) restricting target-marketing of mature-rated products to
children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating information; and (3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.” FTC, Report to Congress, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children 30 (Dec. 2009), online at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf (last visited June 24, 2011,
and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (FTC Report). This system does much to ensure
that minors cannot purchase seriously violent games on their own, and that parents who care
about the matter can readily evaluate the games their children bring home. Filling the remaining modest gap in concerned-parents’ control can hardly be a compelling state interest.” Id.
220 Opt Out of Interest-Based Advertising, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/choices/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
221 Id.
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form of targeted advertising where “the ads you receive on Web pages are customized based on predictions about your interests generated from your visits
over time and across different web-sites. This type of ad customization —
sometimes called “interest-based” or ”online behavioral” advertising — is enabled through various technologies, including browser cookies as well as other
non-cookie technologies.” The opt-out tool allows consumers to opt-out from
receiving Interest-Based Advertising from some or all of the NAI and DAA
participating member companies that use cookies on a consumer’s computer
browser for Interest-Based Advertising. Most major online advertisers are part
of the Online Interest-Based Advertising opt-out regime.222 Thus, the NAI optout regime provides a less restrictive alternative to SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban, by allowing “Users” of online education services to opt-out of receiving targeted advertisements on the service’s platform based on personal
information.
Due to the success of the Pledge and the NAI Advertising Opt-Out, one
could imagine a self-regulatory regime where advertisers and businesses with
advertising platforms agree not to advertise certain content (e.g., vice goods
like cigarettes and alcohol) on educational services to students under the age of
18. Categories of impermissible advertisements could be determined by academic research demonstrating a certain degree of harm, for example, to the
educational atmosphere or student behavior. As mentioned before, academics
have already conducted research on the harm of advertising cigarettes, alcohol,
and junk-food to children.223 Additionally, privacy groups have called for more
academic research focusing on the effect of advertising in K-12 education environments.224
V. CONCLUSION
Student information privacy is destined to be an issue of growing importance as education technology becomes more popular and sophisticated. As
the regulatory scheme surrounding student information grows, legislatures
222 NAI Members, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/participating-networks (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
223 COMMON SENSE MEDIA, ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN AND TEENS: CURRENT PRACTICES
15-16 (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/advertising-tochildren-and-teens-current-practices (discussing the research on how many hours of television children and teens watch and the types of programs they typically view along with what
they search for on the internet, mobiles, and integrated advertising effects on this targeted
audience); Brian L. Wilcox et al., supra note 122, at 7 (discussing the need for more research into the effects of advertising on children given the current research showing that
advertisements exert considerable influence on children).
224 Id.
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must maintain balance between the need to protect student information privacy
and the need to maximize student achievement. Education technology has the
potential to greatly enhance student achievement, and must not become a privilege for those school districts and parents who can afford it. Revenue from targeted advertising may help remedy the growing digital divide in education.
Thus, the promulgation of student privacy regulations should not be an isolated
process, and instead should acknowledge the broader education landscape.
This article is motivated by the unintended consequences created by SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban, namely closing off a potentially large revenue
source that could be diverted to bettering education. The First Amendment argument in this article is limited to illustrating how SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban would likely be held by the Supreme Court to be an unconstitutional
restriction on commercial speech. The Supreme Court is likely to hold first that
California does have a Privacy Interest in limiting the dissemination of personal student information for advertising purposes, and a Commercial Interest in
preventing the commercial exploitation of students, and preserve the educational atmosphere in schools. However, the Court is less likely to hold that California has the same Privacy Interest in limiting the disclosure of adult “User”
information for targeted advertising purposes. Similarly, the Court is less likely
to hold that California has a Commercial Interest in protecting adult “Users”
from targeted advertisements. Second, the Court is unlikely to hold that restricting the use of “User” information for targeted advertising purposes, in
contrast to the disclosure, directly advances California’s interests.
Third, the Supreme Court is likely to rule that SOPIPA’s targeted advertising ban is unconstitutionally more restrictive than necessary because (1) the
ban prohibits targeting advertisements to adult “Users” (e.g. teachers, parents,
or school administrators); (2) the ban prohibits targeting advertisements off of
the operator’s “K-12 School Purposes” platform; and (3) because parents
should be able to decide what content their children view (especially when the
content is not obscene, illegal, or deceptive). Fortunately, there are alternative
methods of achieving California’s objectives, at least as well as, and with significantly less interference than with protected commercial speech. Less restrictive alternatives include: (4) allowing adult “Users” and students to consent (e.g. opt-in) to receiving targeted advertisements; (5) filtering tools that
allow schools or parents to filter the type and/or number of targeted advertisements received by student and adult “Users;” and (6) by deferring to industry
self-regulatory regimes.
Finally, this paper argued that SOPIPA should at least have the following
exceptions, many of which have been incorporated into subsequently enacted
state student privacy laws throughout the country. First, targeted advertising
should be permitted to student “Users,” ages 13 and over, of Operator run “K-
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12 School Purpose” services, to adult “Users” of Operator run “K-12 School
Purpose” services. Second, these advertisements should be permitted to be presented to “Users” when they are off of the educational platform (e.g. not presented in the platform). Third, targeted advertising should be permissible when
it only uses, but does not disclose, a “User’s” personal information for targeted
advertising. Fourth, targeted advertising should be able to serve advertisements
based on non-personal “User” information. Fifth, the categories of permissible
targeted advertising should be extended to protected commercial advertisements related to education, jobs, and politics.

